Faking Cooperation: A Cultural Evolutionary Model of Strategic Deception
This study develops a formal cultural evolutionary model to examine the effects of strategic deception on the stability of cooperation in norm-enforcing systems. Expanding on the framework proposed by Henrich and Boyd (2001), it introduces a third behavioral type: fakers, who simulate cooperation an...
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| 格式: | masterThesis |
| 語言: | eng |
| 出版: |
2025
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10469/25291 |
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添加標簽 | 總結: | This study develops a formal cultural evolutionary model to examine the effects of strategic deception on the stability of cooperation in norm-enforcing systems. Expanding on the framework proposed by Henrich and Boyd (2001), it introduces a third behavioral type: fakers, who simulate cooperation and punishment without incurring their full costs. Unlike traditional free riders, fakers operate from within the normative architecture, mimicking prosocial behavior to gain reputational benefits while avoiding enforcement burdens. The model is structured as a multistage game in which individuals may cooperate, defect, or fake cooperation and enforcement. Payoffs are shaped by execution error, detection probability, and cost asymmetries. Strategies evolve through cultural transmission mechanisms that combine payoff-biased imitation and conformist learning. Numerical simulations are used to examine how different parameter configurations influence the long-term dynamics of cooperation and deception. |
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