Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.

This article presents a theoretical mathematical model that addresses the issue of corruption from an economic perspective, assuming that agents respond to economic incentives (more specifically, relative profitability), and that each one of them has a “degree of resistance to participate in acts of...

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محفوظ في:
التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Pinzón, Kathia (author)
مؤلفون آخرون: Pérez, Wilson (author)
التنسيق: article
اللغة:spa
منشور في: 2021
الموضوعات:
CO2
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/334
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author Pinzón, Kathia
author2 Pérez, Wilson
author2_role author
author_facet Pinzón, Kathia
Pérez, Wilson
author_role author
collection Revista Cuestiones Económicas
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pinzón, Kathia
Pérez, Wilson
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-11-21
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/334
10.47550/10.47550/RCE/MEM/31.13
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Banco Central del Ecuador
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/334/235
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Derechos de autor 2021 Cuestiones Económicas
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cuestiones Económicas; Vol. 31 Núm. 3 (2021): Edición Especial: Memorias IV Encuentro Internacional de Economía EPN; Autores: Kathia Pinzón y Wilson Pérez
2697-3367
2697-3367
reponame:Revista Cuestiones Económicas
instname:Banco Central del Ecuador
instacron:BCE
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CO2
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
Corrupción y desigualdad: un modelo de equilibrios múltiples.
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Artículos de Investigación
description This article presents a theoretical mathematical model that addresses the issue of corruption from an economic perspective, assuming that agents respond to economic incentives (more specifically, relative profitability), and that each one of them has a “degree of resistance to participate in acts of corruption ”(moral cost). Within this framework, the point that we explore in greater detail is the relationship between inequality and corruption. From the perspective of complexity, it makes no sense to ask which cause to which, but rather how equilibria appear, disappear, or shift in the face of a more equal or unequal distribution of the capital stock or moral cost, and which income distribution (originated at work, or in profitability of capital in licit or illicit activities) occurs as a result. These two issues, corruption and inequality, are becoming increasingly relevant, especially in underdeveloped countries (as is the case in Latin America), where both are dramatically present, even calling into question the legitimacy of political systems.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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oai_identifier_str oai:estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec:article/334
publishDate 2021
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Banco Central del Ecuador
reponame_str Revista Cuestiones Económicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Cuestiones Económicas - Banco Central del Ecuador
repository_id_str
rights_invalid_str_mv Derechos de autor 2021 Cuestiones Económicas
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
spelling Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.Corrupción y desigualdad: un modelo de equilibrios múltiples.Pinzón, Kathia Pérez, WilsonCO2This article presents a theoretical mathematical model that addresses the issue of corruption from an economic perspective, assuming that agents respond to economic incentives (more specifically, relative profitability), and that each one of them has a “degree of resistance to participate in acts of corruption ”(moral cost). Within this framework, the point that we explore in greater detail is the relationship between inequality and corruption. From the perspective of complexity, it makes no sense to ask which cause to which, but rather how equilibria appear, disappear, or shift in the face of a more equal or unequal distribution of the capital stock or moral cost, and which income distribution (originated at work, or in profitability of capital in licit or illicit activities) occurs as a result. These two issues, corruption and inequality, are becoming increasingly relevant, especially in underdeveloped countries (as is the case in Latin America), where both are dramatically present, even calling into question the legitimacy of political systems.El presente artículo plantea un modelo teórico matemático que aborda el tema de la corrupción desde una perspectiva económica, asumiendo que los agentes responden a incentivos económicos (más específicamente, de rentabilidad relativa), y que cada uno de ellos tiene un “grado de resistencia a participar en los actos de corrupción” (costo moral). Dentro de dicho marco, el punto que exploramos con mayor detalle es la relación entre la desigualdad y la corrupción. Desde la perspectiva de la complejidad, no tiene sentido preguntar cuál causa a cuál, sino cómo los equilibrios aparecen, desaparecen, o se desplazan ante una distribución más igual o desigual del stock de capital o del costo moral, y qué distribución del ingreso (originado en el trabajo, o en rentabilidad del capital en actividades lícitas o ilícitas) se produce como resultado.  Estos dos temas, corrupción y desigualdad, cobran cada vez más relevancia, especialmente en países subdesarrollados (como es el caso de los Latinoamericanos), en donde ambos se encuentran presentes de manera dramática, poniendo incluso en cuestión la legitimidad de los sistemas políticosBanco Central del Ecuador2021-11-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtículos de Investigaciónapplication/pdfhttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/33410.47550/10.47550/RCE/MEM/31.13Cuestiones Económicas; Vol. 31 Núm. 3 (2021): Edición Especial: Memorias IV Encuentro Internacional de Economía EPN; Autores: Kathia Pinzón y Wilson Pérez2697-33672697-3367reponame:Revista Cuestiones Económicasinstname:Banco Central del Ecuadorinstacron:BCEspahttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/334/235Derechos de autor 2021 Cuestiones Económicashttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2021-11-26T20:11:13Zoai:estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec:article/334Portal de revistashttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCEOrganismo de gobiernowww.bce.fin.echttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/oaiEcuadoropendoar:2021-11-26T20:11:13falsePortal de revistashttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCEOrganismo de gobiernowww.bce.fin.echttps://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/oaiEcuadoropendoar:2021-11-26T20:11:13Revista Cuestiones Económicas - Banco Central del Ecuadorfalse
spellingShingle Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
Pinzón, Kathia
CO2
status_str publishedVersion
title Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
title_full Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
title_fullStr Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
title_full_unstemmed Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
title_short Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
title_sort Corruption and inequality: a model of multiple equilibria.
topic CO2
url https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/334