Logrolling and strategic preferences for high-transaction-cost legislative dynamics A quid pro quo level-k approach
This paper introduces a proposal to consolidate concepts from different branches of economics, such as logrolling and the theory of levels of k-reasoning, to argue how legislators' preferences might vary in a mutually beneficial exchange of votes. It explores the possible forms that utility fun...
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| Materyal Türü: | article |
| Dil: | spa |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
2025
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| Online Erişim: | https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/493 |
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Etiketle | Özet: | This paper introduces a proposal to consolidate concepts from different branches of economics, such as logrolling and the theory of levels of k-reasoning, to argue how legislators' preferences might vary in a mutually beneficial exchange of votes. It explores the possible forms that utility functions could take under transaction cost contexts such as ideological distance and delay in the processing of a bill proposal. It highlights arguments suggesting that a higher k-level could lead legislators to tend toward voting in favor of a coalition. Additionally, it incorporates a logrolling logic model through the conditional probability that the same coalition forms over two consecutive periods. Simultaneously, the article provides a historical overview of logrolling studies and legislative dynamics, considering both psychosocial and behavioral aspects of social choice. |
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