Logrolling and strategic preferences for high-transaction-cost legislative dynamics A quid pro quo level-k approach
This paper introduces a proposal to consolidate concepts from different branches of economics, such as logrolling and the theory of levels of k-reasoning, to argue how legislators' preferences might vary in a mutually beneficial exchange of votes. It explores the possible forms that utility fun...
保存先:
| 第一著者: | |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | article |
| 言語: | spa |
| 出版事項: |
2025
|
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/493 |
| タグ: |
タグ追加
タグなし, このレコードへの初めてのタグを付けませんか!
|
タグ追加