Logrolling and strategic preferences for high-transaction-cost legislative dynamics A quid pro quo level-k approach

This paper introduces a proposal to consolidate concepts from different branches of economics, such as logrolling and the theory of levels of k-reasoning, to argue how legislators' preferences might vary in a mutually beneficial exchange of votes. It explores the possible forms that utility fun...

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Autore principale: Torres, Carlos (author)
Natura: article
Lingua:spa
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/493
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