La crisis bancaria de 1999 un análisis a partir de la teoría de información asimétrica

The present investigation takes like reference to the Asymmetric Information Theory (FIA) and within the same one to the signaling and the screening to try an explanation on the structure and development of the Ecuadorian financial crisis of the last years. In Ecuador the screening is made by the Superintendencia de Bancos and on this exercise it emits one first signaling to the public in general. One second signaling makes the banks by means of their marketing's strategies and interest rates. Finally, the third signaling is emitted by the set of institutions involved in the management of the financial crisis (Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas; and Banco Central del Ecuador). It is of supposition that this set of signalings allows the economic agents to make rational decisions in the allocation from his portfolio and to avoid practices common in the intermediation exercise as they are the adverse selection and/or the moral risk. The results obtained in this investigation demonstrate that the sorcening's banks was inadequate and it was corroborated that the financial information published by the Superintendencia de Bancos did not difterentiate the risk from each one of the organizations.  

• Yazar: Mesías , Andrea (author)
• Materyal Türü: article
• Dil: spa
• Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: 2020
• Konular: crisis financiera; agentes económicos; intermediación
• Online Erişim: https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/222