Not so different: Reforms and multilevel tensions in the selection of subnational candidacies in Argentina and Brazil
Argentina and Brazil illustrate how distinctive electoral designs impact candidate selection for subnational elective offices. In Argentina, the provinces’ autonomy to establish their own electoral rules extends to the selection of candidates. Their adherence to the national law is optional. In Braz...
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| Materiálatiipa: | article |
| Giella: | spa |
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2024
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| Liŋkkat: | https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/view/5946 |
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Lasit fáddágilkoriid | Čoahkkáigeassu: | Argentina and Brazil illustrate how distinctive electoral designs impact candidate selection for subnational elective offices. In Argentina, the provinces’ autonomy to establish their own electoral rules extends to the selection of candidates. Their adherence to the national law is optional. In Brazil, although all states share the same electoral legislation, the rules for choosing candidates are established by each political party, whether at the national or subnational level. This study analyzes how the political reforms carried out in both countries in recent years have affected the selection of subnational candidates. By applying a top-down approach for a multilevel analysis, we argue that political reforms driven from the national level in both countries have posed multilevel tensions that have had various effects on these electoral and party systems, impacting the degree of plurality and the transparency of the elections. In Argentina, the failed process of vertical homogenization of candidate selection through open, simultaneous, and obligatory primaries (PASO) has impacted subnational electoral reforms and practices among provincial political actors. In the Brazilian case, national jurisprudence and reforms have emerged to foster coordination between parties at both levels of government. Both cases show a tendency towards nominations of closed and vertical candidacies as a result of multilevel tensions. |
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